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INTRODUCTION
The most evident feature of the Criminal Justice System (CJS), and probably the root of much of its deficiencies, is its disjointedness. The system has clearly suffered from the lack of a master plan. The individual identities and roles of the criminal justice subsystems, and their interfaces, have been allowed to emerge piecemeal over time. It is no surprise then that this system is constantly in crisis. Three major crises are constantly visiting the system: the number of crimes far exceeds law enforcement capacities, the number of cases far outstrips the availability of judges, and the number of prisoners far exceeds nominal jail capacities.
The actual dimensions of such crises are staggering. In the 14-year period from 1965 to 1979 the population of the United States rose approximately 15%, but the population of Federal and State prisons increased 43% (from 210,815 to 301,017; see Reference 9, Table 347 , page 202), and the incidence of reported crimes increased 105% (from 5.9 million to 12.15 million; see Reference 9, Table 302 , page 182).
The CJS cannot be accused of total negligence in its fight against crime. There has been an attempt to keep up with its rising trend, albeit a losing battle. In the 8-year period alone from 1970 to 1978 total personnel increased by 52.8% (to 1.15 million) ; total expenditures (in nominal dollars) rose by 181% (to $24.09 billion) and continues to rise rapidly (see Reference On the analytical front, numerous criminal justice models have been developed. Existing models unfortunately suffer the same deficiency as the CJS itselfdisjointedness. These models tend to focus on subsystems of the CJS. Their piecemeal formation notwithstanding, both the criminal justice subsystems and models thereof are tightly interfaced. One does not even need a model to appreciate this fact. A rise in arrest rate or conviction rate has an almost immediate impact on jail overcrowding. The model to be presented here vividly depicts this. This paper presents the initial stages of development of an integrative model of the CJS and reports the preliminary results while the authors pursue the task of expanding and adding detail to the model. These results are tentatively validated against existing data.
Crisis-triggering, although not new per se, is introduced as a valuable adjunct to a systemic model. A revision in management's attitude towards crises is advocated: rather than treat crises as events to be avoided or designed away, they must be treated both as opportunities for change and, more importantly, as the bases for change. With the aid of a dynamic structural simulation model, the set of potential organizational crises is developed; each is then artificially triggered via the model. After numerous test runs alternative paths of recovery are then formulated. The procedure can be briefly described. First, the model is used to enact the processes that lead to a crisis. Second, the model is used to point out those parameters of the system which may be adjusted to enhance the state of some system variable or the system itself. Third, the model is used to demonstrate the dynamic behavior of the system in response to parametric adjustments; to show, for instance, how minimizing the probability of one crisis simply increases the probability of another crisis. And, finally, the evolutionary patterns of behavior of alternative regimes can only be discovered through experimentation with a variety of crises and the generation of alternative post-crisis structures of the criminal justice system.
METHODOLOGY
To be more specific, the modeling procedure consists of the following steps: (1) Construction of a crisis-triggered simulation model of the organizational system by a modeling expert perhaps with the aid of a panel of other experts (2) Setting by the panel of the threshold levels or critical values of vital organizational variables, e.g., market share, pollution level, and population density (3) Experimental simulation runs to study the behavior of the system under alternative crisis situations to provide pertinent information for the panel (4) Generation of alternative regimes or new evolutionary patterns of the system with the panel's aid (5) Evaluation or analysis of each regime by the experts. The individuals involved in this procedure are an executive in charge of the system, a modeling expert, and a panel of key representatives of interest groups in the criminal justice system.
The long-term objectives of this research study are to develop a crisis simulation model, demonstrate the way the critical values or threshold levels of vital system variables are set, and produce test simulation runs via a computer to uncover pertinent information by artificially creating crisis situations. This paper reports the initial attempts to develop a crisis simulation model. Subsequent papers will report progress on this major undertaking.
EXISTING DYNAMIC SIMULATION MODELS
The authors have attempted to show (see Reference 6) that even the most prominent dynamic structural simulation methodologies available to date, namely system dynamics' and econometrics,' are ill-suited to the task of modeling such discontinuous processes as crises. A change in the way dynamic structural models are used for crisis modeling is proposed. The basic mathematical relationship used by dynamic structural models is the differential equation. It is well known that a critical requirement of differential calculus is that surfaces and graphs be continuous. When the model system experiences a disruption (a discontinuity), the only way the modeler can represent this is by abruptly switching to a different set of input parameters or, worse, a different set of variables and relationships.
It has also been shown (see Reference 6) that most continuous models do run themselves down into a collapse mode. It is our contention that collapse modes are not surprising at all and may not be all that disastrous given the possibility of intelligent control, or even, of superior mutants of the collapsed system. In fact, it would be more surprising to discover, accidental as it may be, steady-state solutions. Existing dynamic numerical simulations almost always lead to catastrophic results.2.3,4.5.7 When such situations are reached in modeling, simulations are generally stopped, the crystal ball nature of numerical simulations takes root, and modelers assume the role of Cassandras. It is doubtful that modelers could ever avoid the image of Cassandras, or for that matter, even optimistic futurologists, depending on their philosophical orientation. For, such is the nature of the equations used that the modeler would have to be incredibly lucky to find steady-state solutions. It would mean improbably lucky choices of initial conditions or an improbably fortunate set of relationships. We will attempt to eventually show in future reports that our approach can be readily utilized in modeling discontinuities and, more importantly, in aiding government to exploit the dynamics of crises more effectively. Even if one accepts the virtual inevitability of crises, one is still faced with the problem of having to determine, not to mention deal with, which crisis. Dynamic structural simulation models, like those of system dynamics, can be used to generate the set of crises to which a particular socioeconomic system may be susceptible. These crises can be induced and, consequently, studied via simulation models. (It is stressed here that the post-crisis modes of the social system called regimes, are not natural cycles as determined by one set of functional relationships, but are different cycles generated by alternative sets of model relationships invented by experts. The regimes are certainly not periodicities, such as the sunspot cycles, or even economic cycles, but regimes arising from the inability of systems to take themselves out of catastrophic evolution.
In reality, governments are helpless in radically changing the equations of motion abruptly. The functional relationships of the model are not that easily changed. But the modeling approach used does not stress such a drastic, discontinuous measure. Instead, we emphasize that long before the attainment of critical indices are reached, the modeler will have to come up with altered equations of motion representing a new life or evolutionary pattern for the system. It is in this sense that our model is called a crisis-triggered simulation -the crisis may or may not in fact take place in the real world, but the possibility of the crisis is established by the model. In addition, insight into the possible choices one has concerning the system's future is given. Before proceeding to develop that model, we make a few observations about models that have been used previously to simulate various aspects of the CJS.
OTHER MODELS USED TO SIMULATE THE CJS
An extensive survey of criminal justice models and simulation studies has been presented by Chaiken et al.' The majority of simulations performed to date have very narrow purposes, such as allocation of patrol vehicles or manpower scheduling. In the broader models, which deal with court systems and disposition of offenders and prisoners, policy decisions are represented in a static way by constant coefficients which do not depend on values of variables in the model. The effect of changing policies is achieved in these models by changing such constants and re-running the model. In contrast, our model includes policy variables which can vary dynamically over time, to model the manner in which the system adapts to changes in variables amid a restrictive environment. For example, our model has the functional capability to model increasingly lenient sentencing of prisoners and trends toward earlier parole, as the jail population presses close to capacity.
We now turn toward our model.
OUTLINE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE MODEL
There are four major subsystems of the criminal justice system: the societal subsystem which includes families, schools, peer groups, the economy, the churches, etc.; the law enforcement subsystem which includes police agencies, the FBI, etc.; the judicial subsystem; and the penal-rehabilitative subsystem which includes not only jails, rehabilitation agencies, but also parole officers and parolees. In this initial attempt at modeling the CJS, we aim to build a grossly aggregated model which we expect to grow in detail and features as it matures over a period of time. Current focus is on the following variables: (known) crime rate, arrest rate, charge rate (the rate at which those arrested are formally charged in court), conviction rate, average sentences, average time served before being paroled or released after sentence completion, and the jail population. The U.S. population (in year t), P(t), is an exogenous variable of the system and is defined as follows (see Table 1 where M1 is the per person rate of known crime, is initially equal to 0.0297' and grows at an annual rate of 0.051 (the crime rate is seen to be growing at an exponential rate); C1 is a policy variable allowing the modeler to conduct tests on the effect of varying M1 rates on N(t); M7 is per released convict rate of recidivism and is taken as 0.056 ;8 C6 is the policy variable allowing for tests on N(t) of varying M7 rates. It is tentatively assumed that the ratio of one criminal per incidence of crime exists and the data in Table 333 (Reference 7, page 196) seems to reflect this. It can also be argued that the fact that several suspects may be involved in one incidence of crime The rate of arrests (excluding false and wrong arrests), NA(t), is defined simply as a ratio of the known crime rate. Our estimate of this ratio, called M2, is a weighted average between violent and major property crimes and is equal to 0.1974 arrests per known crime (Table 319, page 189) .' This is a fairly constant ratio over the [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] period at least.
where C2 is a policy variable allowing tests on varying rates of M2.
The charge rate, NC(t), is the rate at which persons arrested are charged and brought to court. This is measured on a per person arrested basis. It is also found to be a relatively fixed ratio, M3, of the rate of persons arrested. M3 is equal, on the average, to 0.9028 (Table 319 , page 189).'
where C7 is another policy variable used to vary the per person charge rate. The jail rate, NJ(t), is the number of persons convicted and jailed per year. This is a relatively constant ratio of the charge rate. This ratio is called, M4, and is, on the average, equal to 0.3078. C3 is the policy variable used here.
The release rate, NO(t), combines persons released on parole and persons released after completion of jail sentence. In building an aggregate model of the system we take the average sentence of persons paroled, 5.7 years, and the average sentence of persons released after sentence completion, 1.8 years, and combine them into a weighted average of 2.97. (Many more prisoners are released on parole.) The parameter, M6, is used to represent the average sentence imposed by the court subsystem. Of the sentence given only a portion is actually served in prison by the convict. Average service to parole is 0.38 of the imposed sentence while average service to release is 0.68. The weighted average comes out to 0.59. This average service rate is represented by W6. The policy variable is called C5.
The U.S. population, the known crimes per year, and the jail population levels for the standard model run are presented in Appendix A.
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
It was possible to verify that the model replicates the known crime rate; however, we had been unable to verify model replication of the arrest rate, charge rate, conviction rate, jail rate, and release rate because of the inadequacy or inaccuracy of data. The published arrest rate, for instance, is largely inflated by false and wrong arrests. The model does not replicate the jail populations from 1966 to 1979. The model in fact shows exponential growth. We suspect the accuracy or relevancy of available data. More seriously though, we suspect that the severe constraints imposed by jail capacities have resulted both in release rates being pushed up artificially and detention rates (presently not modeled due to unavailability of useful data) being pushed down artificially. In order for the jail populations to be replicated for the 1966 to 1979 period the release rates have to be pushed up by at least 70%. In fact, it is known that jail populations exceed jail capacities in most prisons. (No effort has been made in this initial formulation to crisis-trigger the model since the system is already rife with crisis points.) To minimize the probability of exaggerating the critical state of the system, we disregard the nominal jail capacities and use the jail populations as estimates of real capacities. We found that the total Federal and State prison capacity has grown by an average of 6,786 convicts per year over the 14-year period in question. In the standard model run alone, we have discovered major inconsistencies in the published crime statistics. We speculate that the CJS has been implicitly utilizing this regime techniqueproposed earlier as part of our crisis modeling procedure. In order to moderate the impression given of crises, at least in the penal subsystem, the CJS managers have somehow been switching to one or more alternative regimes: shortening service times and lower charge rates; both are easily camouflaged. Judges may continue to hand out stiff (or stiffer) sentences and make the courts look good on paper. They can, however, arbitrarily shorten serve times without much notice mainly through the parole option. Likewise, law enforcement agencies can and have increased their rates of arrest and look impressive in the Statistical Abstracts. Our crude model suggests that legitimate arrests are running below 25% of the number of reported arrests.
Crisis triggering
There are three crises presented above -number of crimes exceeding law enforcement agencies' capacities, number of court cases exceeding judicial capacities, and number of prisoners exceeding jail capacities. We have the gravest situation when all three crises are concurrent. This fact presently obviates the need to crisis trigger the model. It would be pointless to test the effects of such alternative policies as (1) improving the arrest rate, (2) increasing the case disposition rate of the judicial subsystem, and (3) increasing jail capacities. Queuing Theory, for instance, states that we have no decision problem when the arrival rate of units (criminals or prisoners) exceeds the service rate (arrest rate, disposition rate, and jail rate) of the respective subsystems.
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult at this stage to make more refined remarks and draw more refined conclusions from our highly aggregated model. In order to develop more sophisticated results we have to move in one or more of the following alternative directions: (1) disaggregationseparating violent from major property crimes, separating juvenile offenders from adult offenders, separating the Federal from the State and Local subsystems, etc.; (2) enlarging the scope -to include the economy, the rehabilitative subsystem, the community (family, school, neighborhood, and peer groups), the government, etc.; and (3) increasing model detail in terms of subsystem interfaces, i.e., increasing the number of interrelationships in the model.
Although we can only obtain more conclusive results from a more developed model we feel that the only promising route for the CJS to take is to expend more of its energy in its rehabilitative effort and to urge, or better, work with, other governmental agencies to mount a major effort toward the lowering of the crime rate itself. We suspect that strategies to manage the crime rate through its economic, psychological, and sociological determinants provide the only hope to put a significant dent on the runaway crime rate of the United States.
